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Abstract 
Social surveillance and supernatural watchers have both been shown to increase prosocial 
behaviour, but previous research has not investigated the full range of cues that can imply the 
presence of a watching mind (natural or supernatural).  This study investigated unexpected 
behaviour as a cue to the presence of a watching mind.  120 undergraduates (mean age = 21 
years, 81 women) completed the Marlow-Crowne Social Desirability Questionnaire and a 
modified Dictator Game on a computer that either worked properly, occasionally malfunctioned 
(flickered to reveal the desktop), or malfunctioned to reveal eye-like images.  No differences in 
social desirability responding or dictator game giving were found for a malfunctioning computer, 
compared to a non-malfunctioning computer, suggesting that the unexpected computer 
malfunction did not cue social surveillance in this experiment. 
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Unexpected events as a cue to social surveillance 
 Ever since Plato’s discussion of the mythical Ring of Gyges, philosophers, political 
scientists, and social scientists have theorized that being observed by others prevents people from 
transgressing moral norms.  People are recorded by security cameras in stores and are watched 
by the police on the highway in order to catch and punish transgressors, but people are also 
reminded that they are being watched, in an effort to deter stealing or speeding in the first place.  
The consequences of being caught committing a moral transgression can involve explicit 
punishment, but may also include reproof, gossip, ostracism, and other lost benefits of 
cooperation.  People can benefit from moral transgressions when they are not identified and 
caught, such as gaining resources at no cost to themselves through theft, but they would suffer if 
other people witnessed their actions.  People are therefore highly sensitive to cues that another 
person is watching, and they often change their behaviour accordingly.  Even false cues, like 
images of eyes that are not attached to an actual human being, can influence people’s behaviour.  
Eye-like designs on a computer desktop (Haley & Fessler, 2005), or above an honesty box in a 
coffee room (Bateson, Nettle, & Roberts, 2006), can lead people to donate more money than 
when eye-related stimuli are absent.  Similarly, ambient darkness or wearing dark glasses 
provides (false) environmental cues that other people cannot see the participants, which can 
increase their dishonest and selfish tendencies (Zhong, Bohns, & Gino, 2010).  Some researchers 
have also proposed that religious beliefs may facilitate cooperation by providing a supernatural 
watcher who is always observing people’s behaviour and is able to punish cheating and other 
transgressions (Bering, 2011; Johnson, 2005; Norenzayan, 2013; for a review see Schloss & 
Murray, 2011).  We do not yet know the full range of cues that lead people to perceive the 
presence of a watching agent (natural or supernatural) and the consequences this can have.  The 
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current study examined how social cues unrelated to seeing a human face can promote prosocial 
behaviour. 
Social and Supernatural Surveillance 
 Human beings are extremely sensitive to cues that another person is present.  Seeing 
faces and agency in natural phenomena can subconsciously influence people’s behaviour, even 
when no agent is actually present. Several studies have shown that surreptitious images of eyes, 
or eye-like designs, in an experimental setting lead to increased prosocial behaviour.  In the 
absence of any actual people, experiments have shown that eye-spots increased the amount of 
money altruistically given to a stranger (Haley & Fessler, 2005; Oda, Niva, Hanma, & Hiraishi, 
2011; Sparks & Barclay, 2013), increased the contribution to a public goods game (Burnham & 
Hare, 2007), and increased condemnation of moral behaviours (Bourrat, Baumard, &McKay, 
2011).   In naturalistic settings, images of eyes have decreased the amount of littering (Bateson, 
Callow, Holmes, Redmond Roche, & Nettle, 2013), increased the amount of money given for 
communal coffee (Bateson et al., 2006), and increased charitable giving in a supermarket 
(Powell, Roberts, & Nettle, 2012).  These studies suggest that people’s behaviour becomes more 
prosocial when cues imply that other people are watching. 
 The majority of studies that have been conducted on this topic have thoroughly 
investigated the influence that eyes have on prosocial behaviour, but there are many other cues 
that could suggest the presence of a human-like mind that is aware of a person’s behaviour.  
Evidence suggests that the belief in the watching mind of a supernatural being can influence how 
people act, even when no watching eyes are visible.  For example, Bering, McLeod, and 
Shackelford (2005) gave participants a difficult visual-spatial task in which they could cheat by 
failing to press the space bar on the computer.  They found that participants were quicker to press 
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the space bar when they were told that the ghost of a dead graduate student had recently been 
seen in the lab.  With children, being told that an invisible person, “Princess Alice,” was present 
led children to cheat less on a game, compared to when they were left alone, a similar decrease in 
cheating to when the children were being observed by an adult (Piazza, Bering, & Ingram, 2011).   
Reminders of God also increase prosocial behaviour in comparable ways to reminders of 
other people.  In the same way that images of eye-spots increase prosocial behaviour, belief in a 
punitive god (Shariff & Norenzayan, 2011) and priming religious concepts is associated with 
increased honesty (Aveyard, 2014; Randolph-Seng & Nielsen, 2007), and increased cooperation 
(Ahmed & Salas, 2011; Rand, Dreber, Haque, Kane, Nowak, & Coakley, 2014).  For example, 
priming participants with religious words (e.g., spirit, God) or secular justice words (e.g., court, 
police) led to similar increases in donations in the Dictator Game (where participants are given 
the control over the distribution of finite resources), compared to unprimed participants (Shariff 
& Norenzayan, 2007).  These studies have led researchers to propose that one way that religions 
encourage moral behaviour is through the belief in watching, moralizing gods (Bering, 2011; 
Johnson, 2005; Norenzayan, 2013; Schloss & Murray, 2011).  According to the supernatural 
monitoring hypothesis, “the cognitive awareness of gods is likely to heighten prosocial 
reputational concerns among believers, just as the cognitive awareness of human watchers does 
among believers and non-believers alike” (Norenzayan & Shariff, 2008, p. 58).  Therefore, 
people who are reminded of the watching mind of a god or a ghost become more prosocial in the 
same way as when they are observed by other human beings, because of a desire to maintain a 
reputation for prosocial behaviour.  
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Cues to Mind Perception 
Unlike humans, supernatural beings do not have actual eyes that can be seen watching 
participants in these studies (Ahmed & Salas, 2011; Aveyard, 2014; Shariff & Norenzayan, 
2011).  This makes it unclear which stimuli lead people to infer the presence of supernatural 
watchers, given that evidence suggests that religious thoughts need to be activated by something 
(see Norenzayan, Henrich, & Singerland, 2013).  While eyes can serve as a cue of a watcher, the 
important aspect of social surveillance is not the eyes, but the mind for which the eyes provide 
evidence.  Minds can be associated with a visible human body, face, and eyes, but evidence 
suggests that there are many other cues that suggest the presence of a living being with a mind.  
Mind perception is not an all-or-nothing phenomena that occurs when one human being meets 
another.  Mind perception can occur in gradations (Tomasello, 1999) ranging from merely 
distinguishing animate agents from inanimate objects (e.g., an animal vs. a rock formation), to 
seeing an agent as engaging in intentional, goal-directed movement (e.g., the animal is trying to 
get food), to seeing an agent who holds conscious beliefs and awareness about the world around 
them (e.g., the animal believes that I know where the food is).  Minds are often misapplied to a 
wide range of entities, such as a failure to perceive other human beings as possessing uniquely 
human mental abilities (Haslam, 2006) or attributing human mental abilities to animals, 
machines, and gods (Epley, Waytz, & Cacioppo, 2007).  Studies in cognitive development have 
demonstrated that even the movement of simple geometric shapes can lead to the perception of 
self-initiated, goal-directed movement of an intentional agent (Gelman et al., 1995; Scholl & 
Tremoulet, 2000).  Socially-contingent reactions can also lead infants to perceive a robot as an 
agent, even in the absence of a face (Johnson et al., 1998).   Therefore, there should be cues other 
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than eyes that facilitate prosocial behaviour, because they lead people to infer the presence of a 
watching agent. 
Unexpected behaviour is another feature that can lead people to perceive the presence of 
mindful entities.  Unexpected behaviours and unexpected occurrences make people more likely 
to perceive agency and a mind in order to understand and explain strange phenomena (Epley et 
al., 2007).  This may reflect an evolutionarily-ancient tendency in cognition to over-perceive 
minds when stimuli are ambiguous or uncertain.  For example, unexpected movements or 
irregular changes in the environment can lead to the perception of a dangerous animal or 
ancestral spirits lurking in the bushes (Barrett, 2000; Guthrie, 1993).  By attributing a mind to 
sources of unexpected behaviour, people may feel better able to predict how it will behave, 
regardless of the accuracy of this feeling (Waytz, Morewedge, Epley, Monteleone, Gao, & 
Cacioppo, 2010).   
Machines are an interesting example, because they have the ability to perform self-
controlled actions, which makes them seem more agentic than most inanimate objects, but they 
cannot make goal-consistent changes to their behaviour in the same way that an intelligent agent 
would (Gelman, Durgin, & Kaufman, 1995).  Machines seem more inanimate as they perform 
regular, expected actions, but seem more animate and mindful as the machines act erratically or 
unexpectedly alter their behaviour.  Consistent with this prediction, Waytz, Morewedge et al. 
(2010) found the more that participants reported that their computer malfunctioned, the more 
they attributed a mind, beliefs, and desires to their computer.   
The Present Study 
The current study used unexpected computer malfunctions during a computer-based task 
to evoke the feeling that the computer has a mind that is aware of participant’s responses, in the 
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same way that eye-images evoke the sense of social surveillance.  Supernatural beings can also 
communicate their intentions through unexpected events.  For example, Bering and Parker 
(2006) found that older children, who were told that the invisible Princess Alice would let them 
know which box to choose, interpreted a flickering light or a falling picture as a sign from her.  
While the computer malfunction used in this study was not associated with any supernatural 
agents, unexpected behaviour by technological machines, or by supposed supernatural beings, 
both evoke the sense of a mind through the same mechanisms of anthropomorphism (Waytz, 
Morewedge, et al., 2010). 
One effect of social surveillance is increased scores on social desirability measures, which 
assess whether people have described themselves in an unrealistically-positive way.  Perceiving 
a watching mind should lead to decreased feelings of anonymity, and several studies have shown 
that decreased anonymity tends to increase socially desirable responses (Becker, 1976; Dodou & 
de Winter, 2014; Joinson, 1999; Richman, Kiesler, Weisband, & Drasgow, 1999).  Similarly, 
participants who were asked questions in a face-to-face interview (Waterton & Duffy, 1984) or 
by an anthropomorphic-looking computer display (Sproull, Subramani, Kiesler, Walker, & 
Waters, 1996; Waytz, Cacioppo, & Epley, 2010) showed increased social desirability responding 
compared to when the questions were asked through written text.  Social desirability responding 
has also been found to be positively associated with religiosity (Sedikides & Gebauer, 2010).  
Gervais and Norenzayan (2012) found that priming people with the idea of God or the thought of 
other people led to increased situational self-awareness compared to un-primed participants, and 
priming religious believers with thoughts of God led to increased social desirability responding.  
These results suggest that making participants aware of a watching mind—whether through other 
people in the experiment, the computerized face, or an omniscient deity—leads them to report 
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more socially-desirable characteristics.  Therefore, social desirability responding should increase 
when the computer malfunction makes participants perceive the computer to have a mind 
(Hypothesis 1).  
Social desirability responding provides evidence that unexpected behaviour cues social 
surveillance, but this is not itself a measure of prosocial behaviour.  The Dictator Game is 
frequently used in psychological studies as a lab-based measure of altruistic behaviour.  In this 
task, there is no explicit incentive to give money or other resources away, as participants cannot 
be punished or otherwise sanctioned for keeping more money for themselves.  Despite this, many 
people in this activity still give some money away.  The amount of money given away in the 
Dictator Game is increased by social surveillance in the same manner that social desirability is 
increased.  Participants who believed that other people knew and would gossip about their 
allocations gave away more money than did participants whose allocations were anonymous 
(Piazza & Bering, 2008).  Several studies demonstrated that the presence of eye-spots increased 
giving in this task (e.g., Haley & Fessler, 2005; Mifune, Hashimoto, & Yamagishi, 2010; Oda, 
Niva, Hanma, & Hiraishi, 2011; Rigdon, Ishii, Watabe & Kitayama, 2009; Sparks & Barclay, 
2013).  Religious primes can also increase giving in the Dictator Game (Ahmed & Salas, 2011; 
Harrell, 2012; Shariff & Norenzayan, 2007), potentially because religious words remind people 
of being watched by supernatural beings (Norenzayan, 2013).  These previous studies suggest 
that participants who perceive a malfunctioning computer to have a mind should allocate more 
resources in the Dictator Game than do participants whose computer does not malfunction 
(Hypothesis 2). 
This study assessed the impact of social surveillance cues on prosocial behaviour by having 
participants complete the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability questionnaire (Reynolds, 1982) 
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and a modified Dictator Game on a computer that elicited various cues of having a mind.  
Participants used a computer that either did not malfunction, malfunctioned by flickering to 
reveal the desktop, or malfunctioned by flickering to reveal the desktop with an eye-like design.  
It was hypothesized that the unexpected action of the computer screen flicker would cue social 
surveillance and increase social desirability responding and Dictator Game allocations, with or 
without visible eye designs.  This would lend support to the position that implied social 
surveillance can facilitate prosocial behaviour even in the absence of real people, and provide 
evidence of a cue other than eye-spots that has this effect. 
Method 
 
Participants 
 Participants were 120 undergraduate students (81 women, aged 17 – 56 years, M = 21.15, 
SD = 5.94).  Participants recruited through the Psych 1000 participant pool and a second-year 
cognitive psychology class received partial course credit (up to 2.5%) for completing a related 
assignment, while participants recruited from flyers posted on campus received $10 for their 
participation.  They also took home the amount of chocolate they had allocated to themselves 
during the Dictator Game. 
Materials 
Social Desirability Questionnaire.  People’s willingness to describe themselves in a 
positive way was measured using the 12-item version of the Marlowe-Crowne Social 
Desirability Questionnaire (Reynolds, 1982), which showed acceptable reliability (Cronbach’s α 
= .68).  On this questionnaire, participants described whether various socially-desirable attributes 
apply to themselves, using a true/false response.  This includes statements that are common but 
socially undesirable, such as “It is sometimes hard for me to go on with my work if I am not 
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encouraged,” or unrealistically positive statements, such as “I have never been irked when 
people expressed ideas very different from my own.”  Participants’ responses are scored such 
that each response in the socially-desirable direction is given one point and the points are added, 
with higher scores representing more socially-desirable responding. 
Dictator Game.  Participants took part in the Dictator Game, an activity where 
individuals are given a finite amount of some resource (usually money), which they can keep or 
redistribute a portion of to someone else (Forsythe, Horowitz, Savin, & Sefton, 1994). The 
Dictator Game was modified to use chocolate instead of money (see Appendix A).  Participants 
were instructed to take up to four small chocolates (various Halloween-sized chocolate bars) for 
themselves from a bowl on the table, knowing that the remainder of the four would be given to 
another anonymous participant in the study.  Chocolates were visible during the entire study, in a 
large bowl containing 30 small chocolates that the participants could choose from during this 
task.  The number of chocolates the participants took for themselves provided a measure of 
prosocial behaviour. 
Unexpected computer malfunction. To manipulate the presence of social cues, some 
participants experienced a “computer malfunction,” where the computer screen displaying the 
questionnaires occasionally flickered to reveal the computer’s desktop.  Some participants saw 
the screen flicker to a blank desktop (Figure 1a), while others saw the screen flicker to a desktop 
with stylized eye images (Figure 1b).  A control group of participants did not see the screen 
flicker at all.  The screen flickered to reveal the desktop for 500 ms during questions one, three, 
seven, and nine of the Social Desirability Questionnaire. 
  
UNEXPECTED EVENTS AS SOCIAL SURVEILLANCE 12 
 
 
 
a.                                                                         b.                                                                         
Figure 1.  Image of the computer desktop revealed during the “computer malfunction.” (a) 
Desktop without eye-images.  (b) Desktop with eye images. 
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Mind of the computer.  A six-item scale was developed to assess the extent to which the 
computer possessed various aspects of a mind: being inanimate (reverse scored), being alive, and 
having goals, intentions, a mind of its own, and conscious awareness (see Appendix B).  
Participants rated the computer that they had used to complete the study on a Likert scale ranging 
from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much).  This questionnaire had acceptable reliability (Cronbach’s α 
= .80), and the scores on this questionnaire were averaged, with higher scores indicating that 
participants saw the computer as having more of a mind.  Participants also reported how 
frustrated the computer made them feel, on a 7-point Likert scale. 
Procedure 
Participants were recruited online through the SONA system or by responding to a poster 
advertisement, and came to the psychology laboratory to complete the study, which took less 
than 30 minutes to complete.  After providing informed consent, participants were seated at a 
desktop computer in a psychology lab, and were left alone in the room to complete the study.  
Participants provided demographic information (i.e., age and gender), then completed the Social 
Desirability Questionnaire, followed by the modified Dictator Game, dividing chocolates 
between themselves and another participant.  Participants were randomly assigned to experience 
either a computer malfunction, computer malfunction with eye-images, or no malfunction.  The 
malfunction occurred as a screen flicker, to reveal the computer’s desktop, during the Social 
Desirability Questionnaire.  Finally, participants answered a series of questions about the 
computer to assess the degree to which the computer seemed to have a mind, were thanked and 
debriefed.  
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Results 
 Mind of the computer.  Participant’s perception that a malfunctioning computer had 
more of a mind was analysed using a one-way between-subjects ANOVA based on experimental 
condition (control, malfunction without eyes, malfunction with eyes).  The degree of a mind 
perceived in the computer when malfunctioning (with eyes M = 2.11, SD = 1.11, without eyes M 
= 2.57, SD = 1.11) did not significantly differ from that of a non-malfunctioning computer (M = 
2.25, SD = 1.27), F (2, 117) = 1.63, p = .20, ns, partial η2 = .03.   
 Frustration.  Participants were significantly more frustrated by the computer when it 
malfunctioned (with eyes M = 3.43, SD = 1.89, without eyes M = 3.66, SD = 1.76), than when it 
did not malfunction (M = 2.28, SD = 1.40), F (2, 117) = 7.57, p = .001, partial η2 = .12. 
 Social Desirability.  Participants’ socially-desirable self-descriptions depending on 
experimental condition were analysed using a one-way between-subjects ANOVA.  Participants’ 
socially-desirable responding did not differ from a non-malfunctioning computer (M = 5.30, SD 
= 3.07) when the computer malfunctioned with or without eye-images (M = 4.64, SD = 2.27, and 
M = 5.03, SD = 2.66, respectively), F (2, 117) = .62, p = .53, ns, partial η2 = .01 (see Figure 2).  
Socially-desirable responses were also uncorrelated with experimental condition and perception 
that the computer had a mind. 
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Figure 2.  Social desirability responding among participants who responded on a non-
malfunctioning computer, or a malfunctioning computer with or without eye-images.  Error bars 
represent 95% confidence intervals.   
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Figure 3. Dictator Game giving among participants who responded on a non-malfunctioning 
computer, or a malfunctioning computer with or without eye-images.  Error bars represent 95% 
confidence intervals.   
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 Dictator Game.  Participant giving rates in the modified Dictator Game depending on 
experimental condition were analysed using a one-way between-subjects ANOVA.  Participants 
were no more likely to give away chocolate to another person when the computer malfunctioned 
(with eyes M = 2.17, SD = 0.96, without eyes M = 2.26, SD = 1.11) than when the computer did 
not malfunction (M = 2.43, SD = .87), F (2, 117) = .72, p = .489, ns, partial η2 = .01 (see Figure 
3).  However, bivariate correlations showed that participants who viewed the computer as having 
more of a mind tended to give less chocolate to another participant, r = -.19, p = .032. 
Discussion 
 This study examined whether the unexpected behaviour of an inanimate object, 
manipulated through a computer malfunction, could act as a cue for social surveillance.  The 
unexpected computer malfunction did not cause participants to explicitly describe the computer 
as having more of a mind than did a non-malfunctioning computer.  The computer also failed to 
act implicitly as a cue to a watching mind, because participants who experienced a computer 
malfunction did not give more socially-desirable responses or give away more resources in a 
modified Dictator Game, both tasks that can be influenced by the presence of watching people 
(e.g., Sproull et al., 1996; Piazza & Bering, 2008).  This manipulation only succeeded in making 
people more frustrated, although this frustration did not have a noticeable effect on social 
desirability or Dictator Game allocations.   In the present study, the computer malfunction may 
have failed to act as a social cue because participants were university students, who regularly use 
computers and are familiar with computer malfunctions.  This familiarity may have prevented 
participants from spontaneously attributing a mind to the computer (as suggested by Waytz, 
Morewedge, et al., 2010), but to attribute the malfunction to the quality of computers in general.  
A more extreme or unusual unexpected event (e.g., unexpected behaviour by technology that 
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usually does not malfunction, such as flickering lights), may be required to activate the 
hyperactive agency detection proposed by some researchers (Barrett, 2000; Guthrie, 1993), and 
could be examined in future research. 
 The present study also did not show an effect of eye-like images as a cue to social 
surveillance.  The computer malfunction on its own was insufficient to affect people’s responses 
in the Social Desirability Questionnaire or the Dictator Game, and participants were also 
unaffected by seeing eye-like images during the malfunction, despite eye-like images effectively 
acting as a social cue in similar tasks in previous studies (Haley & Fessler, 2005; Oda, Niva, 
Hanma, & Hiraishi, 2011; Sparks & Barclay, 2013).  The presence of eye-images may have 
failed to affect participant’s behaviour in this condition, in part, because the effect of eyes is 
weak or inconsistent (e.g., Sparks & Barclay, 2013), but also because the measures used in this 
study were not sensitive enough to detect any effect.  For example, instead of allocating money 
as is usually done in the Dictator Game, participants in this study allocated chocolates to 
themselves and another person.  These chocolates may not have been desirable enough to 
participants, and the number of chocolates may have been so limited (i.e., zero to four) that there 
was not enough variation in participant’s responses to detect any change in prosocial tendencies 
caused by the manipulation.  A large proportion of participants (between 54% and 64%, 
depending on experimental condition) simply split the chocolates in half between themselves and 
the other person.  Therefore, the effect of subtle social cues (whether eyes or unexpected 
behaviour) may be slight, and require more sensitive tasks to be measured.  
 It is also possible that people are not always influenced by the presence of subtle social 
cues, but only show changes in their behaviour when their beliefs about the world allow them to 
attribute these cues to the presence of a watching agent.  For example, Bering and Parker (2006) 
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examined children’s interpretation of an unexpected event (e.g., a flickering light, a falling 
picture) to imply the presence of a watching supernatural being (Princess Alice).  These events 
were only attributed to Princess Alice when the children were told about her; they did not 
spontaneously attribute unexpected events to a supernatural agent.  Similarly, the effect of 
religious primes on a person’s behaviour is only consistent among people who are somewhat 
religious, not among people who do not hold any religious beliefs (Shariff, Willard, Andersen, & 
Norenzayan, in press), indicating that people’s explicit beliefs about the world affect whether 
subtle situational cues will affect their behaviour.   
This perspective has implications for by-product theories of religion, which posit that 
people’s belief in supernatural agents is merely a side-effect of their ability to see minds in other 
humans (Barrett, 2000; Guthrie, 1993).  Vicarious mind perception may not be an inevitable 
consequence of our ability to see minds where they actually exist, but rather an ability that has 
been co-opted by cultural systems to give rise to religious beliefs.  People who believe in 
supernatural minds do not necessarily have greater mind perception abilities in general (Willard 
& Norenzayan, 2013).  Instead, mind perception abilities may be necessary, but not sufficient, to 
have a belief in supernatural minds.  Only when these mind perception abilities are linked to a 
cultural system that promotes belief in supernatural beings, or when people have other attributes 
that prevent them from distinguishing between real and imagined minds (e.g., ontological 
confusion, Lindeman, Svedholm-Häkkinen, Lipsanen, 2015), will people see unexpected 
occurrences as subtle social cues that indicate the presence of watching agents.  Therefore, 
although the present study failed to find any effect of an unexpected computer malfunction as a 
cue to social surveillance, unexpected events could be further examined as a cue to the presence 
of supernatural watchers among people whose worldview involves such beings.  Unexpected 
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events may not automatically activate the perception of an intelligent agent, but they may serve 
as a cue to the presence of a watching mind when other attributions fail, unlike in the present 
study that involved an unexpected computer malfunction as a cue to social surveillance. 
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Appendix A 
Modified Dictator Game Instructions 
At the end of this experiment, you will be given up to 4 chocolates that you can take home with 
you.  You have also been paired with another participant in this experiment.  You can divide 
these 4 chocolates between yourself and this other participant in any way that you choose.  You 
can choose to keep all of the chocolates for yourself, or you can give some of them to this 
participant.    You will not know who this person is and you will remain completely anonymous 
to them.  Please write in the box below how many of the 4 chocolates you want to take home 
yourself.  The rest of the chocolates will be given to another participant.   
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Appendix B 
Mind of the Computer Questionnaire 
Answer the following questions about the computer you are using to complete this study: 
 
1. To what extent is the computer inanimate? 
2. To what extent is the computer alive? 
3. To what extent does the computer have goals? 
4. To what extent does the computer have intentions? 
5. To what extent does the computer have a mind of its own? 
6. To what extent does the computer have conscious awareness? 
 
 
